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MYRES S. McDOUGAL
The Comparative Study of Law for Policy
Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instru-
ment of Democratic Wodd Order
" ... Every true science employs a method of which the technical and pro-
fessional schools make little use. This method is comparison. It is preeminently
the scientific method; without the employment of the comparative method,
no body of knowledge regarding the facts of social life can take rank as a sci-
ence."
Munroe Smith, A General View of European Legal History and Other Papers
(1927) 263.
"The method of natural science rests always on the comparison of observed
phenomena, and the aim of such comparison is by a careful examination of
diversities to discover underlying uniformities. Applied to human societies the
comparative method used as an instrument for inductive inference will enable
us to discover the universal, essential, characters which belong to all human
societies, past, present, and future. The progressive achievement of knowledge
of this kind must be the aim of all who believe that a veritable science of human
society is possible and desirable."
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown in Preface to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African Polit-
ical Systems (1940) xi.
IN A WORLD SHRINKING AT AN ever-accelerating rate because of a re-
lentlessly expanding, uniformity-imposing technology, both opportunity
and need for the comparative study of law are unprecedented. In this
contemporary world, people are increasingly demanding common values
that transcend the boundaries of nation-states; they are increasingly
interdependent in fact, irrespective of nation-state boundaries, for con-
trolling the conditions which affect the securing of their values; and they
are becoming ever more realistic in their consciousness of such inter-
dependences, and hence widening their identifications to include in their
demands more and more of their fellow men. l These changing perspec-
tives of peoples the world over stimulate in turn ever intensifying demands
for wider and wider political co-operation, for the more and more effective
use of conjoined community power, for securing newly clarified and es-
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tablished goals. A general purpose world organization, a host of ancillary
and subsidiary organizations and agencies, a great range of regional pacts
and understandings and of functional unifications, and multiplied thou-
sands of multilateral and bilateral agreements all bear witness, and the
beginning only is here.2 The values for which this co-operation isdemanded
embrace the whole of our present-day democratic preferences for a peace-
ful world. Such values include not only security, in the sense of full op-
portunity, free from violence and threats of violence, to pursue all values
by peaceful, non-coercive procedures, but also all the other value-vari-
ables upon which such security depends:3
the wide sharing of power, both formal and effective, including par-
ticipation in the processes of government and of parties and pressure
groups, and equality before the law;
freedom of inquiry and opinion and for communication of the enlighten-
ment by which rational decisions can be made;
the access to resources and technology necessary to the production of
2 Sohn, Cases and Materials on World Law (1950); De Russet, Strengthening the Frame-
work of Peace (1950); Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization (1950); Holborn, The
Political Collapse of Europe (1951); Bebr, Regional Organizations: Their Functions and Po-
tentialities in the World Co=unity (J. S. D. Thesis, Yale Law School, 1951).
8 The itemization that follows is one designed to permit, by the use of appropriate opera-
tional indices, the most detailed comparative description of varying legal doctrines and prac-
tices, and will be employed in later sections of this article. The reference to "value-variables'"
is intended to emphasize that each value may in varying contexts be both a value that is de-
manded and a base of power for affecting the distribution of values. For more detailed state-
ment of the type of analysis proposed, see Lasswell and McDougal, ''Legal Education and Pub-
lic Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,'" 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 203; Lasswell
and Kaplan, Power and Society (1950); McDougal and Leighton, "The Rights of Man in
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action,'" 59 Yale L. J.
(1949) 60; Lerner and Lasswell (ed)., The Policy Sciences (1951).
We emphasize "policy purposes" because we regard a jurisprudence which purports to be
"scientific" only as inadequate. As important as it is for an observer not to permit his prefer-
ences to distort his vision of the events being observed, a creative jurisprudence requires not
only the ways of thinking and procedures of observation commonly called scientific but also
a number of other integrated and interrelated methods of thought and observation. Such other
methods include the clarification of goal values, the description of historical and contemporary
trends in the realization of values, the critical projection of trends into the future on the
basis of historical and scientific knowledge, and the invention and evaluation of alternatives
of policy by which fundamental goal values can be most fully attained. The use of scientific
procedures alone may, as many studies have demonstrated, be utterly haphazard and sterile.
The other modes of thinking and observation are required to guide the use of scientific pro-
cedures to important problems, to determine the degree of quantification or mathematization
necessary in any particular investigation, and to process any knowledge acquired for use by
decision-makers. Effective inquiry into law requires emphasis upon both policy and science-
in sum, a disciplined use of all relevant modes of thinking and observation.
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goods and services for maintenance of rising standards of living and
comfort;
the fundamental respect for human dignity which both precludes dis-
crimination based on race, sex, color, religion, political opinion, or other
ground irrelevant to capacity, and provides a positive recognition of
common merit as a human being and special merit as an individual;
health and well-being and inviolability of the person, with freedom
from cruel and inhuman punishments and positive opportunity for the
development of talents and enrichment of personality;
opportunity for the acquisition of the skills necessary to express talent
and to achieve individual and community values to the fullest;
opportunity for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal relation-
ships in groups freely chosen;
and finally, freedom to justify common standards of responsibility and
rectitude, to explain life, the universe, and values, and to worship God
or gods as may seem best.
It needs no new emphasis today that our contemporary demands for
co-operation that transcends nation-state boundaries in the shaping and
sharing of values occur in the context of a world power process.4 In this
process the policies that determine the degree to which we can achieve
our values are formulated by many participants-conveniently cate-
gorized as nation-states, international governmental organizations, poli-
tical parties, pressure groups, private associations, and individual human
beings-in multitudinous interactions, the ramifications and effects of
which are global in their reach. The practices by which anyone partici-
pant engages in this process, the bases of its power, and the area, scope,
and weight of influence it achieves are obviously directly affected by the
practices, bases of power, and effects achieved by each of the other par-
ticipants.5 Thus, how a nation-state controls its people and resources and
organizes its institutions as bases of power, how it structures and operates
its foreign affairs procedures for peace and war, and how it regulates and
controls or supports and exports political parties, pressure groups, and
private associations, may vitally affect not only the general practices of
other nation-states and their willingness or unwillingness to engage in
particularmeasures of co-operation but also the amount of power that can
be conferred upon international governmental organizations and the
trans-national roles that can be permitted to parties, pressure groups, pri-
4 Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (2d. Rev. Ed. 1951); Spykman, The Geography of the
Peace (1944).
5 For the development see McDougal, "The Role of Law in World Politics," 20 Miss.
L. J. (1949) 253 and "Law and Power," 46 Am. J. I. L. (1952) 102.
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vate associations, and individual human beings. It is, therefore, an op-
portunity of overwhelming urgency for the comparative study of law to
explore the power processes of the nation-states of the world and to clarify
the variables, both predispositional and environmental, which move
different decision-makers in different nation-states. The urgency of this
opportunity is no less whether one's expectations are of future peace or
of imminent world-wide violence or whether one envisages the whole
globe as the area of co-operation or only certain accessible portions of the
globe. 6 The need is for that understanding of the power processes of our-
selves and others which can give us both realistic orientation in the world
power process as a whole and the special insight required for effective
co-operation in the promotion of each of our basic democratic values,
whatever the exigencies of future violence and whatever the area in which
we can work.7
It may be questioned, however, whether our traditional conceptions
and techniques of comparative study are adequate to meet such contem-
porary need. Despite many exhortations over a period of years,S contri-
butions important to understanding and co-operation are relatively few,
and little important work is presently being done in our law schools or
8 In Griffith (Ed.), Research in Political Science (1948) 17, Loewenstein, Stoke, and Cole
write on the "Role of Comparative Government":
"In this period of total war, which has added to belligerency of a military, economic, and
diplomatic character political warfare as a way to victory, the knowledge of foreign political
institutions and ideologies has become of paramount importance. Cooperative government has
been transformed from a Cinderella-like academic discipline into a political instrumentality
of the most immediate potency. It is obvious that without intimate knowledge of their politi-
cal institutions and attitudes we could not hope to understand what makes our enemies strong,
or to pierce their psychological armor; nor would we be able to assist them after the war in
reintegration into the world community, in case this should be our task."
7 Cj. Yntema, "Comparative Research and Unification of Law," 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943)
261, "Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan,'~ 43 Mich. L. Rev.
(1944) 549, and Review, 54 Yale L. J. (1945) 889; Hazard, "Comparative Law in Legal
Education," 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1951) 264; F. Stone, "The End to be Served by Comparative
Law," 25 Tulane L. Rev. (1951) 325; Rabel, 1 The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study
(1945) xii; David, Traite tlementaire de Droit Civil Compare (1950) 1-214; Czyzak, Review,
1950 Wash. U. L. Q. 548; Kuhn, "The Function of the Comparative Method in Legal History
and Philosophy," 13 Tulane L. Rev. (1939) 350.
B One of the most useful articles still is Le Paulle, "The Function of Comparative Law,"
35 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 838. M. Le Paulle urged:
"But in a period like the present, when many social organisms and functions are growing
very rapidly, often in unforeseeable ways, when the law, in many points, is already far behind
the times, when there is a rising discontent with the inadequacy of the law to meet the new
conditions, it seems that the first duty of any law school, either toward the science of law at
large, or toward its own country, is to train the new generation in such a way as to enable it
to meet the entirely new situations created by the new and profound changes in modern sc>-
ciety,!1
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elsewhere.9 Almost any sampling of current literature and comment re-
veals sharp discontent with the effects being achieved. lO In typical sum-
mary Dean Wigmore some twenty years ago characterized the "litera-
ture of comparative law" as being "marked frequently by the barren
dissection of verbal texts"ll and most recently an editor of this review, in
singling out one book for especial praise, offers contrast with "the glib,
overly general and painfully superficial treatments which have so often
passed current as comparative law."12
The causes of the failure of comparative study to rise to contemporary
need are of course various. Some observers have stressed lingering isola-
tionism13 and narrow, ill-conceived vocationalism,14 Most fundamental,
however, would appear to be the general failure of legal scholarship to
invent and employ a method adequate to the task of realistically describ-
ing and effectively appraising a flow of authoritative decisions through
time, that is, for making fruitful comparisons through time, whether the
comparisons are confined to decisions within the boundaries of single
nation-states or extend across such boundaries.16 The greatest confusion
9 Note the relative paucity of studies cited in Schlesinger, Comparative Law Cases and
Materials (1950) 144.
It is not intended by this over-all negative appraisal to underestimate the importance of
certain specific contributions, such as those of Professor Rabel in private international law
or of Professor Hazard in Russian law. Such oases serve, however, only to make more con-
spicuous the desert.
10 Thus Stone, supra, note 7, 334, writes:
"Perhaps at no time in history have we had so many conferences, so many books and ex-
changes and so little clear knowledge of the end which they serve."
For a sampling of reviews highly critical of present methods and results, see Riesenfeld,
3 J. Legal Ed. (1951) 620; Fulda, 36 Com. L. Q. (1950) 185; F. Stone, 26N. Y. U.L.Q.Rev.
(1951) 239; Timasheff, 26 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. (1951) 393; and Rashba, "Consecrated Ignorance
of Foreign Law?," 39 Calif. L. Rev. (1951) 355.
II Wigmore, "More Jottings on Comparative Legal Ideas and Institutions," 6 Tulane L.
Rev. (1932) 244, 263.
12 Von Mehren, Review, 65 Harv. L. Rev. (1952) 532, 534. The book praised is Dawson,
Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (1951).
13 Macmillan, Review, 63 Law Q. Rev. (1947) 227, 228 writes: "Isolationism may well
find its last refuge in the tenacity with which each nation clings to its own legal system."
14 F. Stone, Review, 26 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. (1951) 239.
In "Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan," 43 Mich. L. Rev.
(1944) 549, 550, Yntema writes:
"Thus, until but recently, historical attachment to the Common Law as a bond of Anglo-
Saxon unity, acceptance of the formal, authoritarian notion of law developed by Austin as the
instrument of utilitarian reform, and the approach to government as a branch of social science,
the last outside the pale of law proper, incongruously joined to form a basic philosophy of law
in the United States, that while it persisted, doomed legal science to exegetic impotence."
15 Yntema has made the point most cogently that fruitful historical study of decision-
making processes within a single nation-state requires perfection and application of compara-
tive methods. See "Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law," 2 Law: A Century of Prog-
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continues to prevail about what is being compared, about the purposes
of comparison, and about appropriate techniques. The "law" that is being
studied is still too often regarded as a body of doctrine or rules, divorced
from power and social processes. Studies are still organized, and compari-
sons attempted, in terms of technical doctrines of highest level ambiguity,
doctrines which purport to perform in one and the same reference the very
different functions of describing past decisions, of prescribing what
future decisions should be, and of predicting such decisions. The concep-
tion of law as a decision-making process, and a process in which the de-
cision-makers are influenced by many variables, has had as yet but few
effects. Conceptions of scientific method for study of the variables, in-
cluding technical doctrines, that affect decision are most inadequate.
Precise study of trends in decision and conditioning factors is almost non-
existent. Little effective effort is made to relate decisions to basic com-
munity values or, when discrepancies are observed, to clarify values and
adopt a creative attitude in the invention and adaptation of new means.
The consequence is a literature that is voluminous, obsessively repetitious,
and sterile-a literature that feeds and grows, like a psychic cancer, upon
logical classification and reclassification and technical refinement and
sub-refinement, without limit and with a minimum of external reference
and relevance.16
Remedy for the failure of comparative study must naturally begin
with removal of its causes. Any program for the comparative study of
law which would be fruitful must, therefore, apparently include among
its intellectual tools three indispensable prerequisites: first, a clear and
realistic notion of what is being compared; second, an understanding of
and interest in the purposes of the comparison sufficient to guide and sus-
tain it; and, finally, techniques of comparison adequate to yield knowledge
ress (1937) 346 and "Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan," 43
Mich. L. Rev. (1944) 549. Cf. Pollock, "The History of Comparative Jurisprudence," 5 J.
Compo Leg. (N. S.) (1903) 74; Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays
(1944).
16 Hug and Ireland in "The Progress of Comparative Law," 6 Tulane L. Rev. (1931)
68, 73, excoriate common procedures:
"To take some rule or accepted formula covering a definite point of doctrine in one system
of law, find a similar expression in one or more other systems, and write a note or longer com-
ment which could in effect be boiled down to a quotation of the various provisions more or less
adequately translated into the author's language with references (as to the variously numbered
sections of the respective national codes) sufficient to enable the original versions to be found,
neither involves important mental processes by the writer nor excites contributory stimula-
tion in the reader. A numerically selective robot could produce as fruitful results from a good
shelf of statutory compilations. It may be remarked in passing that the character, as second-
ary source material, of any discussion of one or more problems in the system of law of a single
jurisdiction or of the whole system itself (however exotic and remote ethnically or geographi-
cally) or of a single homogeneous group (as "the civil law"), is not altered by its being presented
in a language or place not its own; and such a presentation does not by itself fall within our
definition of comparative law."
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relevant to and sufficiently precise for the purposes established.17 It is to
each of these prerequisites that we propose to direct a few preliminary and
tentative observations. IS
It is fortunately becoming increasingly recognized today that what
must be compared, if comparisons are to be relevant and useful, is not
doctrine merely but doctrine and practice, not a flow of rules merely, but
a flow of decisions. 19 Comparison cannot relevantly and usefully be con-
fined to rules alone both because rules are not the only variables that af-
fect decision and because, as embodiments of policy crystallizations of
the past, they may not offer adequate description of the effects of new
decisions.20 The process of decision-making is indeed, it is now common
17 Schmitthoff, "The Science of Comparative Law," 7 Cambridge L. J. (1939) 95 makes
comparable demands and offers the beginnings of clarity in establishing an adequate theoreti-
cal structure.
18 Throughout this article the writer draws heavily upon collaborative studies with Profes-
sor Harold Lasswell in seminars on Law, Science, and Policy and World Community and Law.
19 For inspiring application of this insight see Llewellyn and Hoebel, "The Cheyenne Way"
(1941).
In "The Progress of Comparative Law," 6 Tulane L. Rev. (1931) 68, 73, Hug and Ireland
make eloquent statement:
"To understand the history of the rule, to trace its principal sources, its developing vicis-
situdes, and its final formation and acceptance, to appreciate its relation to other parts of the
instant system, and, most important of all, to learn Its actual operation, to see what it does as
distinct from what it says, by consultation of the commentators and more importantly by
examination of the actual decisions of the courts to carry through this analysis for each of
the great systems of law, classifying and discussing as many of the subdivisions as circum-
stances permit, to discover and set forth the similarities and differences oftheexistingsolutions,
and then to make a summation of the whole resultant with a view to an at least partial and
temporarily valid prediction as to the tendency of current doctrine and lines of decision, more
correctly constitutes the real purpose of comparative law."
In "Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan," 43 Mich. L. Rev.
(1944) 549, 557, Yntema insists:
"Mere formal collocation of the laws to be compared is not adequate; account must be taken
of the interpretative doctrines and their illuminating applications by the courts to specific
problems, as well as of the differing structures of ideas, the historical background, and the
special procedural and practical aspects, relating to each question. The problem is to examine
not mere formulations in abstracto but functioning legal institutions, as they appear each in
its more or less specific social context."
20 Kahn-Freund makes concise summary in his Introduction to Renner, The Institutions
of Private Law and Their Social Function (Kahn-Freund ed. 1949):
"Positivism is a utopia. The law is neither consistent nor self-sufficient. Whatever theorists
may say and whatever he himself may think and say, the judge constantly recurs to an analy-
sis, articulate or inarticulate, of the moral, social, and economic function and effect of the rules
and principles he applies and of his own decision."
Contrast Sereni, on "Teaching Comparative Law," 64 Harv. L. Rev. (1951) 770, 776,
who suggests that "a law course should study the law from within and in itself rather than in
relation to other standards of human conduct." He adds:
"Although the study of law as a social institution is an important topic, it belongs to the
realm of social science, rather than to the curriculum of a law school, inasmuch as such a study
deals with the law as an aspect of social behavior."
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knowledge, one of continual redefinition of doctrine in the formation and
application of policy to ever-changing facts in ever-changing contexts.21
The variables to which decision-makers respond, the factors which affect
decision, are both environmental and predispositional. Environmental
variables include the facts of a particular controversy, the competing
claims of the parties, and the standards invoked (comprising both tech-
nical legal doctrines in terms of rights, duties, powers, property, title,
contract, tort, sovereignty, due process, and so on, and policy propositions
in terms of basic community values), as well as the whole community
context.22 Predispositional variables include the attitudes (demands for
values, identifications, and expectations), skills, class positions, and char-
acter structures of decision-makers.23 It is, therefore, obvious that differ-
ent decision-makers responding to different variables may in cases which
a disinterested observer would regard as comparable use the same tech-
nical doctrines to reach different results or different technical doctrines
to reach the same results.24 Hence, comparison even of technical doctrines
can be made meaningful only when such doctrines are located in the re-
21 Judge Jerome Frank in Courts on Trial (1949) Ch. X, "Are Judges Human," offers an
informal account of the factors that may affect decision. See also Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process (1921); Green, Judge and Jury (1930); Cohen and Cohen, Readings in
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951) Ch. 6; Von Mehren, Review, 63 Harv. L. Rev.
(1949) 370 (referring to continental judges); Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 Col. L. Rev. (1949)
735; Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 Col. L. Rev. (1947) 527.
22 For elaboration see McDougal, "Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarifica-
tion and Reform," 55 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) 1077; Lasswell and McDougal, "Legal Education
and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 203.
23 The relevance of such variables is outlined in detail by Lasswell in Power and Personality
(1948).
Mead in Ch. IV, "The Study of National Character," in Lerner and Lasswell, The Policy
Sciences (1951), describes the present state of comparative research.
24 Demand for a "functional approach" to comparative study has been made many times.
Thus, Rheinstein in a classic and highly influential article on "Teaching Comparative Law,"
5 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1938) 615, 617 wrote:
. "The statement that law is a means of social control and organization has almost become
a commonplace. Not all the implications of this I?roposition have been fully realized, however.
For legal science, it implies the task of inquiring mto the social function of every legal rule and
institution."
More recently in Report of Institute in the Teaching of International and Comparative Law,
American Association of Law Schools (1948) 83, 111, Rabel succinctly states:
"Every comparison, of course, needs a common denominator, a tertium camparatianis. For
me in these fifty years past, this has always been the social purpose of the rules and the service
of the concepts to this purpose. This is now aptly called the functional approach."
The demand for inquiring into functions is, however, but the beginning of insight. Further
questions are "functional" for whom, against whom, with respect to what values, determined
by what decision-makers, under what conditions, how, with what effects. Comprehensive
guiding theory must take all these questions into account.
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spective decision-making processes in which they are being used and
observations are made of the equivalences and non-equivalences in ef-
fects which different decision-makers responding to different variables
achieve by the use of such doctrines.26 Comparison which extends beyond
the traditional fixation upon technical doctrine to the comprehensive and
systematic investigation of the other important variables that affect
decision must clearly require the study and exposure of decision-making
processes in their entirety.26
It may perhaps bear emphasis that the decisions requiring study are
not merely governmental decisions, that is, decisions by officials who have
formal authority and are expected by community myth to make important
community decisions. Formal authority and effective control mayor may
not be conjoined in the same decision-makers in any given community.!7
Effective control over decision may invarying degree be located ingovern-
mental institutions, but it may also in degree equally varying be located
in political parties or pressure groups or private associations. The indi-
viduals who in fact make the decisions may rely for their power not upon
formal authority but upon wealth, enlightenment, respect, or other val-
ues.28 The degree to which the technical legal doctrines of a community
2~ Le Paulle makes the point forcefully:
"First, it must be clear that a comparison restricted to one legal phenomenon in two coun-
tries is unscientific and misleading. A legal system is a unity, the whole of which expresses it-
self in each part; the same blood runs in the whole organism. Hence each part must necessarily
be seen in its relation to the whole. An identical provision of the law of two countries may have
wholly ditIerent moral backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly
ditIerent forces, and hence the similarity may be due to purest coincidence-no more sig-
nificant than the double meaning of a pun."
"The Function of Comparative Law," 35 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 838, 853. So also Dean Pound
in "Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1951) 1:
"But a fruitful comparative law must involve more than comparison of legal precepts, im_
portant as that is. There should be comparison of systems of law as systems, not merely pre_
cept by precept."
Cf. SchmitthotI, "The Science of Comparative Law," 7 Cambridge L. J. (1939) 95,97.
The big question is, however, how an organization of studies can be perfected which will
permit either the comparison of systems or the making of partial comparisons which can con-
tribute to comprehensive understanding.
26 Margaret Mead generalizes:
"The science of culture can insist, therefore, that when we consider contrasting types of
behavior we shall attend always to the complete system, and that random, indiscriminate cita-
tions of cultural contrasts in detail be strictly recognized for what they are, iconoclastic polemic
material, ammunition for agitators, but with no scientific validity."
"The Comparative Study of Culture and The Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values'~
in Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (1942) 56, 58.
'n For development of these distinctions in detail see Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and So-
ciety (1950) Chs. V and VIII; McDougal, "Law and Power," 46 Am. J. 1. L. (1952) 102.
28 Malinowski in his Introduction to Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia (1937) xxxi,
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represent reality or illusion may in great measure depend upon the exact
interrelations of formal authority and effective control,29 Thus, a con-
stitutional prescription of doctrines for the maintenance of civil liberties
and an attempted balancing of power between legislative, executive, and
judicial institutions may succeed in a community where effective control
is widely dispersed but fail in a community where legislative, executive,
and judicial institutions remain subject to a concentrated effective con-
trol that is hostile to civilliberties.30 Hence, comparative study of the
realities of practice as well as myth must take into account not only the
structures and processes of formal authority but also those of effective
power, and of their interrelations.
The purposes that may move different observers to the comparative
study of decision-making processes are of course many and varied.31
urges students "never to forget the living, palpitating flesh and blood organism of man which
remains somewhere at the heart of every institution."
Similarly Radcliffe-Brown in his Preface to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African Political
Systems (1940) xxiii, offers in a description of the "state" insights too often forgotten:
"In writings on politi<;al institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the nature and
the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over and above the
human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attributes something called
'sovereignty', and sometimes spoken of as having a will (law being often defined as the will of
the State) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense, does not exist in the phenomenal
world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e. a collection of
individual human beings connected by a complex system of relations. Within that organiza-
tion different individuals have different roles, and some are in possession of special power or
authority, as chiefs or elders capable of giving commands which will be obeyed, as legislators
or judges, and so on. There is no such thing as the power of the State; there are only, in real-
ity, powers of individuals-kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and
voters. The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is
concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force. This, it is suggested,
provides for an objective study of human societies by the methods of natural science, the most
satisfactory definition of the special class of social phenomena to the investigation of which
this book is a contribution.!!
2~ C/. F. Stone:
"We must study the history, the politics, the economics, the cultural background in litera-
ture and the arts, the religious beliefs and practices, the philosophies, if we are to reach sound
conclusions as to what is and what is not common."
"End to be Served by Comparative Law," 25 Tulane L. Rev. (1951) 325,332. See also Gutter-
idge, Comparative Law (2d ed. 1949) 174.
30 An illustration borrowed from a lecture by Professor Franz Neumann.
31 The literature upon the purposes of comparative study is voluminous. In addition to the
articles already cited, the following items are among the many that deserve attention:
Gutteridge, Comparative Law (2d ed. 1949) ch. 1; David, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil
Compare (1950) 1-214; Wigmore, 3 A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems (1928) 1119;
Schlesinger, Comparative Law Cases and Materials (1950) 8; Bryce, 2 Studies in History
and Jurisprudence (1901) 607, 619; Pollock, "The History of Comparative Jurisprudence,"
5 J. Compo Leg. (N.S.) (1903) 74; Vinogradoff, 2 Collected Papers (1928) (various essays on
jurisprudence); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Cook ed. 1923) 340; Ehrlich,
"Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentals of Its Study," 21 Col. L. Rev. (1921)
HeinOnline -- 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 34 1952
34 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Relatively recent surveys include such itemizations as "the general pur-
pose of any science: the search for truth", increase in the understanding
of the legal rules and institutions of one's own country, increase in the
understanding of foreign laws and of assistance to practitioners, the uni-
fication of laws, increase in the understanding of international law, im-
provement of legislative policy and definite legislative purposes, "develop-
ing understanding of the role of law as a social institution", decreasing
the exercise of arbitrary power and increasing the rule of law, and "the
instilling of values".32 It is believed, however, that there is today, for
scholars who demand and share responsibility for the. values of a free
society, one central purpose which can unify and revivify all these other
purposes. Most broadly conceived, that central, over-riding purpose is,
in accord with the opportunity and need we have urged above, the clari-
fication for all our communities-from local through national and regional
to global-of the perspectives, the conditions, and the alternatives that
are today necessary for securing, maintaining, and enhancing basic
democratic values in a peaceful world.33
The potentialities of the comparative method for value clarification at
different community levels have just begun to be demonstrated.34 Enough
creative comparative studies have been made, however, to suggest that
the method can be used to clarify the values of the peoples of the world,
not for simple verbal unification or for promoting any particular world
organization, but rather for demonstrating the deep underlying equiva-
lences in their demands for the values of a free society, for reinforcing their
623; Hazeltine, "The Study of Comparative Legal History," 1927 J.S.P.T.L. 27; Escarra,
"The Aims of Comparative Law," 7 Temple L.Q. (1932) 296; Lambert, "Comparative Law,"
4 Encyc. Soc. Sci. (1937) 126; Cohn, "The Task and Organization of Comparative Jurispru-
dence," 51 Juridical Review (1939) 134; Friedmann, "A Comparative Law Course at Mel-
bourne University," 1 J. Soc. Pub. T. L. (N.S. 1949) 274; Lawson, "The Field of Compara-
tive Law," 61 Juridical Review (1949) 16; Auld, "Methods of Comparative Jurisprudence,"
8 U. Tor. L. J. (1949) 83; Hazard, "UNESCO and the Law," 4 Record (1949) 291; Dainow,
"Teaching Methods for Comparative Law," 3 J. of Legal Ed. (1951) 388.
82 These itemizations are taken by random sampling from Rheinstein, "Teaching Com-
parative Law," 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1938) 615; Hazard, "Comparative Law in Legal Education,"
. 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1951) 264; Stevenson, "Comparative and Foreign Law in American Law
Schools," 50 Col. L. Rev. (1950) 614; Yntema, "Roman Law as tbe Basis of Comparative
Law," 2 Law: A Century of Progress (1937) 346; and F. Stone, "The End to be Served by
Comparative Law," 25 Tulane L. Rev. (1951) 325.
33 Cf. Riesenfeld, Review, 3 J. Legal Ed. (1951) 620; Sayre, Review, 36 Iowa L. Rev. (1951)
585; Sturges, "The Quest for World Law and Order," 22 Tulane L. Rev. (1948) 558; Hazard,
supra, note 32; and Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (1949) 101.
84 The most significant and dramatic demonstration has been in the United Nations Human
Rights program. For introduction, see Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights
(1950); Robertson, "The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights," 27
B.Y.B.I.L. (1950) 145.
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expectations that they can best maximize their own individual values in
such society, for cementing their loyalties to such society, for increasing
the identifications of all free peoples with each other, and for in general
establishing the consensus and predispositions necessary to effective co-
operation in whatever forms of organization may be most appropriate
under contemporary conditions.35 It has already been sufficiently urged
that the method is indispensable to understanding of the world power
process and the various component processes that condition every meas-
ure, external or internal, co-operative or unilateral, in every community.
Certainly no other method promises more in the invention and adaptation
of felicitous alternatives, doctrines and procedures, for the achievement
of our emerging goals, whether world, regional, national, or local.36
For achieving its central and other important purposes, it will be es-
sential for comparative study to discover and apply both a comprehensive
guiding theory and the techniques adequate to describing comparable
decisions through time and across political boundaries. The comprehen-
sive guiding theory that is necessary must permit, and require, an inves-
tigator to categorize the facts to which decision-makers respond in terms
of value changes (as contrasted with doctrinal technicalities) which
3& The theme is developed in McDougal and Leighton, "The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action," 59 Yale, L.J. (1949) 60, 108.
The possibilities of discovering deep underlying equivalences in values, despite differences
in institutional doctrines and practices, are emphasized by many observers. See, for examples,
Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures" in Linton (ed.) The Science of Man in
the World Crisis (1945) 123 and Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (1949).
The latter writes:
"Related to the lack of a functional view of human affairs is a difficulty in seeing common
qualities and common dynamic patterns when they appear in widely different contexts, or in
strikingly different shapes. If one does not think in functional terms, it necessarily follows that
he will not perceive how functions exist like recurrent themes in an enormous variety of differ-
ent situations. Non-scientific thinking tends to generalize on the basis of gross similarities and
differences of structure, not on similarities and differences of dynamic process." (161).
"It seems impossible that a jelly-fish and a man can have the same ground plan, so great
is their difference in appearance; yet they share metabolism, growth, reproduction, respiration,
irritability, and much else." (162).
For expressions of the possible range of legal equivalences see Rheinstein, Review, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. (1951) 1387; Neumann, Review, 64 Pol. Sci. Q. (1949) 127 (indicating a certain lack
of originality in Soviet law); Kahn-Freund, Introduction to Renner, The Institutions of Pri-
vate Law and Their Social Function (Kahn-Freund ed. 1949); Jackson, "Some Problems in
Developing an International Legal System," 22 Temple L.Q. (1948) 147; Eder, A Compara-
tive Survey of Anglo-American and Latin-American Law (1950) 4; and Friedmann, "A Re-
Examination of the Relations between English, American, and Continental Jurisprudence,"
20 Can. Bar. Rev. (1942) 175.
86 Hug, "The History of Comparative Law, 45 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 1027 offers some in-
dication of the tremendous diffusion of legal techniques in various epochs. A helpful recent
contribution is Lenhoff, "America's Legal Inventions Adopted in other Countries," 1 Buffalo
L. Rev. (1951) 118.
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transcend the peculiarities of national or regional institutional practice;
to take into account all the important variables that affect decision and
to clarify the doctrinal variables, and the predispositions that decision-
makers bring to decision, in terms of the basic individual and community
values sought; to make precise description of the trend of decisions
through time and to appraise the impact of different technical doctrines
among other variables in conditioning different decisions; to identify in
detail the community values in fact at stake in a flow of decisions and to
assess the compatibility of alternative decisions with the values so clari-
fied; and, finally, creatively to explore the whole range of alternatives,
in both doctrine and institution, that may be adopted or invented for
maximizing decisions in accordance with community values under the
given conditions.37 Specific techniques in the application of this guiding
theory must, drawing upon all the insights and skills of contemporary
scientific study of culture38 and personality,39 be adequate for performance
of all the indicated tasks.
IfI These are the indispensable procedures in a "policy oriented" approach to any legal study.
Lasswell and McDougal, Syllabus, Law, Science, and Policy (1950).
88 Lerner and Lasswell (Ed.), The Policy Sciences (1951) offer survey and bibliography of
recent studies. See also Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites
(1952); Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols (1952); and Lasswell,
Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics (1951).
The rich insights of Malinowski remain largely unused by legal scholars. See Malinowski,
A Scientific Theory of Culture and other Essays (1944); The Dynamics of Cultural Change
(1945); Introduction to Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia (1937); "A New Instrument for
the Interpretation of Law-Especially Primitive," 51 Yale L.J. (1942) 1237; 1 Coral Gardens
and Their Magic (1935) Ch. XI; Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926). Other recent
books rich in suggestion are Murdock, Social Structure (1949); Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man
(1949); Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1949); and Kroeber, Social Theory and
Social Structure (1944).
Significant studies more directly related to power processes are UNESCO, Contemporary
Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching (1950); Timasheff, An Intro-
duction to the Sociology of Law (1939); Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social
Growth (1939); MacIver, The Web of Government (1947); Merriam, Systematic Politics
(1945); Mosca, The Ruling Class (Livingston Ed. 1939).
Widely heralded recent books such as Parsons and Shils (Eds.) Toward a General Theory
of Action (1951) and Parsons, The Social System (1951) seem to lack sufficient orientation in
power processes and to take too little account of predispositional variables to be of direct use
to legal scholars. Professor M. J. Levy, Jr. of Princeton will publish in the summer of 1952
a book, The Strutture of Society, which will explicitly apply the same general approach to the
comparative study of societies.
39 Introduction to a vast literature may be obtained through Dollard and Miller, Person-
ality and Psychotherapy (1950); Money-Kyrle, Psychoanalysis and Politics (1951); Stanton
and Perry (Eds.), Personality and Political Crisis (1951); Kardiner and Associates, The In-
dividual and His Society (1939) and The Psychological Frontiers of Society (1945); Kardiner,
The Mark of Oppression (1951) Ch. II; Alexander, Our Age of Unreason (Rev. ed. 1951);
Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society (1945); and West, Conscience and Society (1945).
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It is not our pretension that we can here proffer theory and techniques
of the necessary perfection. Their discovery or invention will require long
work by appropriate specialists. It is believed, however, that a beginning
contribution can be made to one possible, over-all organization of com-
parative studies which might enable scholars, with appropriate skills
and resources, to produce some of the information so urgently needed
today.
The prime need, as we have observed, is for an organization of studies
which will permit the location of any particular decisions being compared
in a context which will reveal the degrees of their equivalence or non-
equivalence in effects on values.40 The organization we propose is, there-
fore, explicitly oriented to values and seeks to relate all decisions in a
hierarchy of power processes to the values they affect.41 It assumes that
the value-shaping processes in any community, however limited or in-
clusive in time and space, can be conveniently described in terms of in-
terdependent value-variables and institutions. In terms of value-variables
one may describe a community process as people using such values as
power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being (including safety,
health, character, comfort) rectitude, skill, and affection as bases to ef-
fect desired distributions of these same values among themselves and
others. Institutions are the patterns of practices, the myths and tech-
niques, the doctrines and procedures, by which such distributions are
effected and may of course, vary in infinite detail from community to
community.42 Fruitful comparisons become possible when basic values
40 Dean Pound's theory of "interests" could serve this purpose if appropriate operational
indices were supplied for each interest and the various interests were explicitly related to the
predispositions of decision-makers. See Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," 57 Harv. L.
Rev. (1943) 1; J. Stone, The Province and Function of Law (1946) Chs. XX, XXI, XXII.
Without such amplification, the theory leaves obscure what is being compared, how the com-
parison is made, and by what criteria results are appraised. These consequences are apparent,
despite a fascinating collection of materials, in Simpson and J. Stone, Cases and Readings on
Law and Society (3 Vol. 1948). See McDougal, Review, 45 Am. J. I. L. (1951) 399, and the
earlier indication of the difficulties in Dean Pound's theory in Le Paulle, "The Function of
Comparative Law," 35 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 838.
41 The writer some years ago projected a more ambitious outline in collaboration with Dr.
Karl Graf, of Switzerland, and what is presented here draws in some measure on the earlier
collaborative work.
42 More detail on this type of analysis appears in Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society
(1950).
The UNESCO volume on Contemporary Political Science (1950) offers few alternatives.
In an essay on "The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States" (at page 77),
Cook writes:
"Here I wish only to urge that possibly adequate classifications may rest on major human
motivations, or human needs (the two are not identical), if these can be adequately separated,
for postulational and observational-experimental purposes, or as major, permanent, and virtu-
ally omnipresent institutions."
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are clarified and the infinite variety of institutional detail is appraised
in tenns of its effects on such values.48 For comparisons either as between
communities or in a single community through time, the important gen-
eral questions are: What are the structures and processes, the doctrines
and practices, by which each value is shaped and shared, and what are
the effects of these structures and processes, these doctrines and practices,
on each other value? With respect to each value, in detail, what are the
degrees of equivalency or difference in doctrine, and also in technical
procedures? Thus, one may ask of any community or of a series of com-
munities: What are the power structures and processes of this community?
What are the roles of particular doctrines and practices in the shaping and
sharing of power? What are the effects of these structures and processes,
these doctrines and practices, on the shaping and sharing of all other val-
ues? What are the wealth structures and processes? What, again, are the
roles of particular doctrines and practices and what are the consequences
of the processes as a whole for all other values? And so on for each impor-
tant value in the community or communities under study.44
An outline, though brief and at highest level abstraction, may make
clearer the type of over-all organization of studies we suggest. Under the
four main headings of Power Processes, Value Processes, Private Asso- .
ciations, and Policy Procedures, and with more or less impressionistic




A comprehensive picture of the world power process must identify the
participants and describe the interactions in which they influence each
43 Bodenheimer, Review, 3 Stanford L. Rev. (1951) 755, graphically depicts a dilemma of
"the Scylla of overgeneralization" and "the Charybdis of exaggerated specialization." He
writes:
"If the teacher chooses the method of selecting some specific and narrow topics ... he is
in danger of losing himself in details and fostering in his students a type of specialized thinking
apt to mistake the trees for the forest. If, on the other hand, he is inclined to paint with a
wide brush, and to indulge in broad generalities regarding the basic differences or similarities
between the world's legal systems, he takes the risk of giving an oversimplified and faulty pic-
ture." .
Fulda in Review, 36 Com. L.Q. (1950) 185, wisely insists:
"Without some fundamental philosophy which brushes aside millions of details the value
of comparative law as a subject of organized study would remain obscure."
44 Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem Social Legislation (1950) which is organized about the
value we would describe as "well-being" indicates the potentialities of a value by value analy-
sis.
HeinOnline -- 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 39 1952
McDOUGAL: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW FOR POLICY PURPOSES 39
other, the bases of their power (in control over people, values, institu-
tions), the practices they engage in (ranging from volition-procedures to
coercion), and the effects they get (in control over people, values, insti-
tutions).45 Nation-states are still by far the most influential participants
in this process and most of the important decisions in application of the
doctrines of traditional public and private international law as well as
of municipal doctrine are made by officials deriving' authority from na-
tion-states.46 Inquiries that would reveal relevant predispositions and
practices about the globe might be organized as follows:
A. Interactions. 47 For the admission of new groups to the formal pro-
cesses of international law and organization, nation-states have evolved
a curious ceremony called "recognition". The granting or withholding of
this ceremony, with its attendant benefits in diplomatic intercourse and
access to formal power, is used by each state against new groups as an
instrument for improving its own power, and other value, position. The
important questions are: who within any given nation-state is authorized
to bestow recognition on another body politic; by what standards in
international and national policies does the recognizing official act; by
what formalities is the ceremony effected; what are the consequences
in terms of access to formal authority and other values of recognition as
between nation-states and with respect to the claims of private individ-
uals; what meaning, if any, in terms of such consequences can be given
to traditional distinctions between recognition de jure and de facto, recog-
nition of governments and states, and conditional and unconditional
recognition.
B. Bases of Power. The effective power of a nation-state is determined,
not only by resources and geographical position, but also by its practices
in controlling people and resources and the efficiency of its organization
for internal and external purposes. People are controlled by selective ad-
missions and expulsions, by differential admission to citizenship and to
U McDougal, Lasswell, and Leighton in Syllabus, World Community and Law: A Contem-
porary International Law (1950) present a detailed outline with bibliography.
40 Cf. Niemeyer, Review, 4 World Politics (1952) 282:
"We need to say and repeat often that the essential prerequisites for a society, a monopoly
of force and a broad consensus about the uses of such centralized force, do not exist on a world
scale. This means that any rational approach to the problem of international order must take
fully into account the existence of a multitude of centers, each capable of exercising a certain
amount of ordering functions. The play of forces among these centers, the stability of their
positions, and their power relative to each other are phenomena of fundamental importance to
the problem of international order."
47 For sake of brevity and special relevance to comparative study the general analysis is
here somewhat abbreviated. A more comprehensive outline appears below with respect to the
National Power Process.
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the various value processes (discriminations against minorities on grounds
of race, color, alienage, opinion, etc.), and by the systematic positive use
of various values to secure conforming behavior (treason, espionage, sabo-
tage, military service, compulsory labor, compulsory indoctrination, con-
trol of weapons, and so on). Non-governmental groups such as political
parties, pressure groups, and private associations are managed with vary-
ing degrees of encouragement, regulation, policing or suppression. Re-
sources and wealth processes, including the functions of allocation, plan-
ning, development, production, and distribution, are controlled in a wide
range of practices between the polar extremes of regulated private enter-
prise and complete governmentalization. The efficiency of internal insti-
tutions in mobilizing manpower and resources into an effective military
establishment, the degrees of independence, in formal authority and fact,
from other power units, and the forms of alliance with other power units,
for the positive support of policies, vary greatly from nation-state to
nation-state. Comparative study of all these variations in bases of effec-
tive power could contribute much more to real understanding of the world
power process than the customary reiteration of the doctrines of public
international law about dual nationality, acquisition and loss of territory,
and sovereignty.
C. Practices. The practices by which nation-states engage each other
range between the polar extremes of peaceful procedures and war, and
present a continuous process of attack and defense by all weapons, diplo-
matic, ideological, economic, and military. The important question for
comparative study is, in general, how the foreign affairs power is struc-
tured, and operates, in different states. What is the structure of formal
authority (constitutional pattern; division of powers between executive,
legislative, and judicial institutions; division, if any, between national
government and internal units) and what is the structure of effective
controls (who actually makes the decisions and subject to what pressures)?
How do structure and operation in any given state compare with that in
others when measured by such criteria as democracy (widely shared
power), efficiency (quickness, flexibility, rationality in respect to values),
representativeness of national interest, responsibility to other nation-
states, and maintenance of civilian supremacy? What, in detail, is the
constitutional competence to negotiate and conclude international agree-
ments, how are such agreements made internally binding within the na-
tion-state, by what criteria do officials interpret such agreements, and
by what criteria and procedures are they terminated, internally and in-
ternationally? Where, in further detail, is the war power located, what is
its scope, and to what, if any, commitments does the nation-state sub-
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scribe for the initiation and conduct.of hostilities? Enough studies have
been made to indicate the rich supplementation that might be added to
the doctrines of public internationallaw.48
D. Effects. The effects that a nation-state achieves, from its bases of
power and by its practices, in terms of control over people and resources
embrace all of the problems of the field of Private International Law as
traditionally conceived.49 The most general question is over what events
(value changes) a nation-state will exercise its power to effect its own pol-
icies and with respect to what events will it limit its exercise of power in
expectation of similar reciprocity in self-restraint by decision-makers in
other nation-states. In specific controversies some one nation-state has
effective control over persons or resources which it can use as a base for
power, and the issue is whether it should exercise its power to make its
own policy for the events under review, or whether, out of deference to
its own long term interests or to the interests of other states or to a regional
or world community interest, it should dispose of the controversy either
by refusing· to exercise its power or by applying policy formulated by
another state. For resolution of controversies of this kind, decision-makers
have customarily invoked as justifications for decision certain mysti-
cal notions of "jurisdiction", "territoriality", "nationality", "domicile"
and the like, and reified derivations from "contract", "property", "tort",
"crime", and so on, all of which made a confused reference at one and the
same time to facts, policies, and official responses to facts. The whole
body of doctrine is more than ordinarily nebulous and confused. Rational
inquiry must begin by differentiating controversies in terms of significant
differences in fact: who the parties are, nation-state versus individual,
individual versus individual, national or non-national, corporate or non-
corporate; what values (power, wealth, etc.) are at stake for the parties,
for the nation-state of the decision-maker, for other nation-states, for
regional groupings, and for the world community; whether the value
changes contested took place by agreement or deprivation, volition or
coercion ("contract", "tort", "crime", "expropriation" etc.); the locus
of each significant event in the value changes contested (within the terri-
tory of the decision-maker, within the territory of others, on the high
48 For examples, see Preuss, "The Execution of Treaty-Obligations Through Internal Law-
System of the United States and of Some Other Countries," Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law (1951) 82, and "The Relation of International Law to the inter-
nal Law in the French Constitutional System," 44 A.].I.L. (1950) 641; Deener, "International
Law Provisions in Post-World War IT Constitutions," 36 Com. L. Q. Rev. (1951) 505.
49 The fruitfulness of comparative study has been superbly demonstrated by Professor
Rabel's monumental work: Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (3 Vol. 1945-
1950).
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seas, etc.) and the territorial range of the effects of such events; the locus
of any resource affected and the type of resource (land, obligations, ships,
etc.); the types of "acts of state"-legislative, executive, or judicial-
that have occurred in nation-states other than that of the decision-maker;
whether the nation-state of the decision-maker has "recognized" the other
nation-state purporting to declare policy for the events in question; and
so on.60 With types of controversies so differentiated, comparative survey
of how decision-makers located in different nation-states apply traditional
technical doctrines to different controversies might pemlit effective ap-
praisal of such doctrines in terms of their consequences for the values of
all interested parties. It has long been demonstrated that "territorial"
notions of jurisdiction are largely outmoded, that too much emphasis
upon the physical locus of an event is irrational because what matters to
individual citizens as well as to nation-states is not simply where an event
takes place but the total effect on values. 51 The task of constructing a new
and rational doctrine to take the place of the outmoded remains, however,
a challenge to the comparative study of Private International Law.
II. NATIONAL
The power process of any particular nation-state operates within the
context of the world power process and both affects and is affected by
the larger context. 52 Above, our principal concern was for effects upon the
world process. Here our concern must include as well effects upon the
distribution of values within the nation-state. Comprehensive study must
again identify participants and describe arenas, of interaction and in-
fluence, methods of access or admission to such arenas, bases of power,
practices, and effects. Participants may be conveniently categorized as
government, political parties, pressure groups, private associations, and
individuals. Government refers to the officials established by formal au-
thority and who are expected to make the important decisions sustained
by community coercion, political parties to groups who present candidates
and platforms at elections, pressure groups to organizations primarily
devoted to the manipulation of government and political parties, and
private associations to groups primarily designed for the shaping and
sharing of values other than power but which seek power effects. Indi-
viduals act in both organized and unorganized ways. In any nation-state
60 The beginnings of such an approach are illustrated in Salonga, Private International
Law (1950) Supplement r. Professor C. J. Olmstead, of New York University Law School,
has in preparation a more detailed outline.
61 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942).
62 A more detailed and illustrated outline has been prepared by the writer and Mr. Edward
McWhinney, of Australia.
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power processes affect other value processes (wealth, enlightenment, re-
spect, etc.) and other value processes in turn affect the power processes.
Hence description may conveniently begin with the broad outlines of
power processes and then develop, in spiral fashion, the details of doctrine
and practice in more precise description of the role and effects of power in
each of the other value processes. Relevant comparative inquiry into the
broad outlines of power might, beginning with government, proceed as
follows:
A. Arenas. The call here is for the interactions in which power is shaped
and shared, and these may be described in terms of the interrelation of
decision-makers in conventional institutional structures-constituent or
amending, legislative, executive, administrative, judicial-and in effec-
tive control groups.
B. Admission. The question is how officials obtain access to positions
of power, and all qualifications, elections, and appointment practices are
relevant.
C. Bases of Power. The general inquiry here is how formal authority,
to invoke and apply community coercion, is divided among officials.
Divisions may be made between the delusively functional institutions-
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial-or geographically (with
varying degrees of centralization or "federalism") between national and
provincial or local authorities. Comprehensive survey and comparison
require a precise indication of exactly what powers are granted to what
officials, over whom, with respect to what values, and subject to what
conditions or limitations. Formal authority and other factors may of
course invest officials with effective control over violence, resources, en-
lightenment, and other values, and the varying degrees of such control
are unquestionably of the greatest significance to fruitful comparative
study. Degrees of effective control may perhaps, however, be more easily
appraised after completion of other inquiries.
D. Practices. The practices by which officials participate in the shap-
ing and sharing range from the maintenance by coercion of a framework
of order to the direct provision of goods and services. The framework of
order is designed to secure within the limits of community policy the ex-
pectations created by private agreement and volition, to protect varying
degrees of private control over resources, to insure individuals against
arbitrary deprivations, and to maintain conformity with certain stand-
ards of rectitude in behavior. Both the maintenance of a framework of
order and the direct provision of goods and services require the formation
and application of policy in a series of steps ranging through the collec-
tion of intelligence, the clarification and recommendation of proposals,
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authoritative enactment or prescription, invocation, interpretation, ap-
plication in specific instances, and termination. The task of comparative
study is to expose how these different functions are performed in different
nation-states and to appraise differences in performance.
E. Effects. The effects that officials achieve by their practices require
appraisal not only in terms of the degree to which power is shared but also
in terms of consequences for the distribution of each major community
value. Hence detailed appraisal requires more specific investigation (out-
lined below) with respect to each value.
Delineation of the varying roles of political parties, pressure groups,
private associations, and individuals requires the asking and answering
of the same fundamental questions, appropriately modified, as to arenas,
admission, bases of power, practices, and effects. The importance for
comparative study of party systems, pressure group operations, private
association controls, and individual powers and freedoms may safely here
be assumed.
Building upon this broad description of power processes, more intensive
exploration of the special role and effects of power in each of the other
value processes, and of the reciprocal impacts of the various value proc-
esses, can seek amplification and detailed elaboration of bases of power,
practices, and effects with respect to each major value. For systematic
survey and comparison we suggest for each value (wealth, enlightenment,
etc.) an outline as follows:
A. Bases of Power.
1. Formal authority.
(a) Affirmative Powers. The explicit grants of formal authority to
government officials that may be used to affect the distribution
of the value under study.
(b) Limitations. The constitutional provisions of doctrines pur-
porting to restrict official power which may be invoked to limit
or control the exercise of the powers indicated above.
2. Effective Controls. The structure of political parties, pressure groups,
private associations, and unorganized individual activities, with
controls over various base values, that conditions the application
of both powers and limitations.
B. Practices. The flow of decisions that in fact affects the shaping and
distribution of the value.
1. Formal authority. The official decisions applying powers and limita-
tions in shaping and distributing the value.
2. Effective controls. The details of how the non-governmental par-
ticipants bring their influence to bear on particular decisions.
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C. Effects. Final summary of the distribution of the value among the
members of the community in consequence of the practices above and
an appraisal of impacts upon the distribution of other values.
III. LOCAL53
Exactly the same analysis can be applied to local or provincial power
processes with appropriate modification of the detailed questions. The
great range of intergovernmental relations that affect local decisions in-
creases the elaborateness of the inquiry into arenas and admissions. The
wide variety of general function and special function units and the varying
sources of authority in constitutions and from higher levels of govern-
ment add to the complexity of bases of power. Frequent obliteration of
the lines between the conventional institutions of higher levels of govern-
ment (legislative, executive, etc.) makes even more important the care-
ful specification of functions in describing practices. Effects are sometimes
difficult to trace because of the fuzzy hierarchy of responsibility and the
impact of many decisions. The fundamental inquiries are, however, com-
parable, and the potentialities of comparative study for understanding
and policy guidance are no less so. Consider, for example, what careful
comparative study in various countries of one principal local problem,
the establishment and maintenance of an efficient physical environment,
might reveal. A pooling of experience and the best contemporary wisdom
about such functions as the control of community design, the regulation
of land use, the provision of public services, securing improvements and
development, policing, quality standards in construction and mainte-
nance, protecting consumers against price gouging, and the administra-
tion of public controls, might lead to improvements everywhere in the
performance of such functions. 54
VALUE PROCESSES: AGREEMENTS AND DEPRIVATIONS
Working within a context of broadly described power processes, com-
prehensive comparative study of the details of how community coercion
is employed in different nation-states to channel and control the agree-
ments and deprivations by which individuals shape and share values in
community life, may choose between a number of alternative principles
of organization. The traditional principle, as we have seen, is that of
53 A detailed outline has been prepared by Professor W. T. Mallison, Jr., of the George
Washington Law School. Our intent in the text here is to present only enough comment to
indicate that the same type of analysis is applicable to any power structure at any areal or
regional level.
64 For detailed organization with respect to these problems, see McDougal and Haber,
Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning and Development (1948) Ch. IX.
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legal technicality which may not sufficiently transcend national peculiar-
ities and which commonly refers, simultaneously and without discrimina-
tion, to the value changes to which decision-makers are responding, to
the policies by which they justify decisions, and to the decisions that are
made. Almost any alternative would seem preferable. One possible al-
ternative would be an organization, value by value, in which each value
(wealth, enlightenment, and so on) is taken separately for comprehensive
and integrated investigation of the various doctrines and practices by
which the community controls both agreements and deprivations with
respect to that value. An alternative less disturbing to conventional legal
predispositions is perhaps to organize by agreements and deprivations,
but with the detailed location of both agreements and deprivations in
value and institutional context. So long as all variables significant for the
effective study of factors affecting decisions, of the consequences of de-
cisions, and of the clarification of community policies are kept explicitly
at the focus of attention and are not confused, the exact principle of or-
ganization is not too important. The mode of organization which we will
indicate by brief comment begins, accordingly, with agreements and de-
privations, and seeks to add necessary value and institutional orientation.
In a society aspiring to be free, the principal mode of shaping and shar-
ing values is by agreement, in the broad sense of volition. Simple deference
to human dignity requires that respect be given to individual volition to
the extent that it can be kept compatible with over-all community
policies in securing and preserving basic values for all members. The
generalized task of the "law of contracts" is to establish both a framework
within which individuals by their own initiative and agreement can shape
and share values and certain limits beyond which volition cannot trans-
gress upon community policies. The two most important questions for
comparative study are: To what degree with respect to what values
(power,66 wealth, enlightenment, etc.) in what varying institutional con-
texts does this community give effect to private agreement? By what
doctrines and practices does this community seek to make private agree-
ment effective to this degree in this context? More detailed inquiry re-
quires specification of how certain functions are performed. These may
be itemized briefly as:
A. Fixing Policy Limits. Determining whether a particular agreement
55 Even though power processes have already been broadly described, it is necessary to
continue to work with power in order to secure more and more detail of the interrelations
with other values and institutional practices. One is reminded of Maitland's metaphor of the
"seamless web." .
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in its context is within or contrary to over-all community policies. Agree-
ments for race discrimination, for buying or selling public offices, or for
locking up resources from use, may be denied community protection
without further consideration.
B. Securing Intent. Making certain that there is a final expression of
intent, an agreement, or behavior that should be regarded as raising ex-
pectations in others that a commitment has been made. This is the func~
tion that traditional doctrines about offer and acceptance, writing and
seal, parol evidence rule, consideration, mistake, duress, fraud, conditions,
competence of parties, illusory promises, and their equivalents are de-
signed to serve.
C. Enforcement. The use of community coercion to make certain that
the promised expectations actually are forthcoming or that appropriate
redress is made. This is the function of the traditional remedies, such as
damages, specific performance, injunction, imprisonment. The principal
question is what remedy in this context of value and institution is the
most economical in securing the most efficient operation of private agree-
ment to the extent preferred.
D. Protecting Against Third Parties. Preventing third parties from in-
terfering with promised expectations or from taking the benefits of agree-
ments without appropriate assumption of burdens.
E. Honoring Transfer of Benefits. Determining conditions under which
promisees may transfer benefits of agreements to others.
F. Construction. Determining the relations of the parties with respect
to exigencies they did not foresee or foresaw only vaguely.
G. Termination. Putting an end to the agreement when it has served
its purposes or when, though lawful in the beginning, it has become in-
imical to community policy.
H. Subjection to Community Claims. The imposition of appropriate
community burdens in the form of taxation, eminent domain, and exer-
cises of the police power.
It is reasonably obvious that with respect to all these functions both
community policies and the responses of decision-makers will vary with
the values primarily and secondarily at stake and with the priorities as-
cribed to such values in varying institutional contexts. Hence any sig-
nificant comparative study of how these functions are performed in dif-
ferent communities must make cross-categorizations in terms both of the
values affected and of an infinite variety of institutional context, such as
the resource being used, the presence or absence of competition, and ef-
fects on consumers, or of in general such varying details as appear in the
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contexts of insurance, construction, manufacturing, banking, labor, and
so on.68
The kind of specification of context that is necessary, if comparative
study of doctrines and practices about agreements is to be made fruitful,
may perhaps be indicated by reference to certain agreements and expres-
sions of .intent which explicitly concern resources. For the parties to such
agreements wealth is commonly the value primarily at stake, but other
values may be involved and the degree of their involvement may make
a difference to decision and to policy. Thus, with respect to agreements
or expressions of intent which seek merely to transfer claims to resources
from one party to another, and which in sum effect a continuing alloca-
tion of the community's resources among private users, the relevant in-
quiries must cover all the doctrines and practices by which community
officials perform the various functions itemized in the paragraph above. 67
How are the agreements policed to insure that their objectives are within
community bounds? How are parties protected from economic duress,
onerous time stipulations, and other penalties? What procedures are af-
forded for securing clear, comprehensive, and uncoerced expressions of
intent? How efficient is the public recording system designed to afford
protection against third parties? Is it comprehensive, conclusive, and
economically ordered? Does it enable promisors quickly and easily to
establish their claims and promisees to know that they are getting what
they are promised? And so on. With respect to agreements or intents that
go beyond mere transfer and seek to regulate future uses of resources or
claims to wealth, which seek to establish what is sometimes called "dead-
hand control", the inquiry becomes more complex.68 The objectives of the
parties in such transactions extend beyond wealth effects to effects on all
other values. Wealth objectives include both care of dependents and suc-
cessors and a wide variety of commercial purposes. Non-wealth objectives
range from community (promotion of education, advancement of religion,
improvement of government, relief of poverty, promotion of health or
patriotism, etc., etc.) to private (preventing specified behavior-marry-
ing, divorcing, drinking alcohol, gambling, etc.-by specified persons, or
obtaining specified behavior-care of tombstones, pet animals, houses,
etc.-from specified persons). The mode of restraint or deadhand control
U Mueller, Contract in Context (1951) indicates the difficulties in focussing traditional
materials on one "long term commercial project." Kessler and Sharp, Cases on Contract
(Mimeographed 1950) offer a policy orientation, though somewhat less systematic and com-
prehensive than we propose.
67 For more detail, see McDougal and Haber, Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Plan-
ning and Development (1948) 113 el seq.
68 /d. 246.
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attempted may include the devotion of a fund to specified purposes in
perpetuity or for a long period of time, shifts from one person or purpose
to another upon future events, ascertainment of beneficiaries only upon
some future event, restraints on the anticipation of income or principal,
restraints on the alienation of specific resources, the accumulation of in-
come, and restraints on management. The form of wealth may vary
through all the protean forms of "land" and funds. The management es-
tablished mayor may not include persons entitled to beneficial enjoyment
under the transfer. The mode of establishment may be by corporate char-
ter, by unadorned agreement, or by "legal" or "equitable" property forms
or other equivalents. Transferors and transferees vary greatly in both
value and institutional position and in capacity to affect community
values.
Significant comparative study must make allowance for all these and
other variables with appropriate precision in survey of how community
coercion is brought to bear in performance of all the separate functions
itemized above. The critical questions are, in brief, to what degree, for
what length of time, and by what modes will dead hand control be
honored for the various purposes in varying contexts, and what are the
consequences for all other problems. Answer to these questions is obscured
in Anglo-American countries by the continued use of ancient doctrines
which dichotomize "legal" and "equitable" interests and classify "pos-
sessory estates" and "future interests" by such temporally exotic terms
as determinable fees and possibilities of reverter, fees subject to condition
subsequent and rights of entry, reversions, vested and contingent remain-
ders, executory interests, and so on. One task of comparative study might
be to determine whether this language serves purposes other than of
obfuscation.
As for agreements, whose purpose is primarily to plan or regulate land
use among neighboring occupants, the inquiry is scarcely less complex.69
The parties to such agreements may of course seek simply efficient use as
among themselves, but they may also seek to strike directly against some
basic, value of the community, as by provisions that resources shall be
locked up or that premises can be occupied only under conditions of race
discrimination; or to interfere directly with specific community plan, as
by restricting to residential purposes land marked out by the community
for business or manufacturing development; or to interfere with the effi-
cient operation of the community's planning process, as by providing that
specified land shall be used only for specified purposes, such as for hitching
&D /d. 475.
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racks or fish markets; or to bind land as security for personal gratifications
not easily commutated in money, such as for the singing of songs or the
croaking of frogs; or to bind land to inefficient and outmoded practices
in use and development. The land affected may be located in rural or
urban areas and may be of many different forms (surface, air, light, water,
minerals, oil, sub-surface, etc.). The uses affected may cover the whole
community range: residential, productive, manufacturing, business, pub-
lic service or utility, or governmental. Durations specified for control may
be permanent, indefinite, for definite period, or temporary. The number
of users permitted may include only specified parties or the public gen-
erally. The agreement may be evidenced by non-verbal behavior, oral
permission, action in reliance, unsealed writing or sealed writing and may
be in language of promise or language of grant. The value and institutional
positions of parties to agreements may vary greatly. Comparative study
must again take all these variables into account if it would resolve the
mysteries of easements, profits a prendre, licenses, running covenants,
equitable servitudes, and interests "in the nature of" easements, and so
on, and their foreign law equivalents, and seriously attempt discovery and
appraisal of the effects of differing doctrines and practices.
For protecting their members against unauthorized deprivations, for
maintaining certain standards in expectation and behavior irrespective
of individual commitment, communities afford various procedures and
remedies. When the deprivations are of sufficiently great danger to com-
munity and individual values, the violation of authoritative community
standards sufficiently gross, the deprivations may be called "crimes" and
the community may itself take the initiative and impose certain counter-
deprivations of varying degrees of severity, commonly called criminal
sanctions, upon offenders. When the deprivations are considered to in-
volve less threat to community interest, they may be termed "torts"
or "delicts" or private wrongs and initiative in invoking measures of
redress may be left to the injured parties or their representatives. Effec-
tive comparative study of how officials make these decisions and afford
appropriate sanctions or remedies requires location, comparable to that
suggested for agreements, in value and institutional context.
With respect to deprivations regarded as "crimes", the relevant in-
quiries may be indicated in broadest outline.60 What values in what in-
stitutional contexts does each community under study protect by criminal
sanctions? Who in what value and institutional position is protected
80 For imaginative demonstration of the potentialities of a value oriented approach see
Dession, Criminal Law Administration and Public Order (1948). Professor Dession is presently
making wide comparative applications of his general analysis. See Donnelly, "The New
Yugoslav Criminal Code," 61 Yale L. J. (1952) 510.
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against whom in what value and institutional position? How in detail are
conventional "crimes" related to the protection of particular values, such
as power (treason, espionage, sabotage, sedition), wealth (larceny, em-
bezzlement, fraud), well-being (homicide, assault, rape), respect (genocide,
libel, peonage), rectitude (blasphemy, obscenity, polygamy), affection
(adultery), skill (practicing profession without license), and enlighten-
ment (failure to school children)? How is the community organized to
formulate and apply standards for protection from such deprivations?
What are the special procedures for detection, apprehension, trial, and
punishment? How in detail are standards applied in fact through time and
what standards, if any, over-ride all value and institutional contexts and
what are related to particular contexts and types of deprivation? What
defenses are permitted to offenders in various contexts in terms of im-
munity for age or position, coercion, mistake, mental or physical incapa-
city, entrapment, consent, former jeopardy, and so on? What are the
sanctions invoked against particular offenses and how are such sanctions
applied, administered, and terminated? What effects are achieved by var-
ious criminal sanctions in terms of securing behavior patterns in accord
with established standards? What alternatives are there to such sanctions?
With respect to the deprivations regarded as "torts" or private wrongs,
the relevant inquiries are similar. What values in what institutional con-
texts does each community protect by private remedies against depriva-
tion? Who is protected against whom and how, again, in detail are con-
ventional "torts" related to the protection of particular values, such as
power (deprivations of access to public office, voting, and effective con-
trol groups; improper performance of official functions; false arrest or im-
prisonment), wealth (trespass, nuisance, ultra-hazardous activities, in-
terference with subjacent or lateral support; conversion, negligence;
unfair competition, unauthorized use of trade secrets, interference with
contractual relations, misrepresentation; discrimination in hiring, firing,
or tenure or in access to labor organization), well-being (assault and bat-
tery, malpractice, breach of statutory duty, negligence, ultrahazardous
activity), respect (defamation, malicious prosectuion, invasion of privacy,
denial of access to public utilities and institutions), rectitude (denial of
access to institutions of worship, defamation of religious groups), affection
(seduction, alienation of affections, interference with family relations),
skill (unauthorized use of trade secrets, denial of access to professions or
unions), enlightenment (denial of access to educational facilities or chan-
nels of communication, misrepresentation)? How is the community or-
ganized to establish and apply standards to such deprivations? What in
detail are the standards established and applied with respect to particular
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deprivations? What distinctions are made between intended and unin-
tended harms, and ordinary and ultra-hazardous activities? What are
the doctrines with respect to breach of duty, causation, and matters of
defense? What particular remedies-compensatory damages, punitive
damages, injunction, restitution-are made available for redress of par-
ticular deprivations? How effectively do these remedies secure the es-
tablished community standards? What alternatives to such remedies are
available in insurance practices or public administration or other insti-
tutional forms?
PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS
In describing power processes it is necessary to direct attention to pri-
vate associations in so far as such associations seek direct effects upon
power. There is, however, the further task of investigating community
doctrines and practices in promoting and regulating such associations for
the primary purposes they are designed to serve. For this investigation
a convenient division may be made of such associations in terms of these
primary purposes, viz., between associations primarily devoted to the
production and sharing of wealth and those devoted to other values.
I. ASSOCIATIONS DEVOTED TO THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING
OF WEALTH
In most general form the relevant inquiry is what forms of association
are afforded to whom for what detailed objectives by what methods and
how are activities policed in the interests of members and the commun-
ity.61 In common law countries the forms afforded include both unin-
corporated organizations (agencies, partnerships, joint stock companies,
business trusts, and such informal associations as joint ventures, syndi-
cates, and pools) and incorporated organizations (closely or widely held,
privately or publicly financed). Detailed objectives of the parties include,
in addition, the production of goodsand services and the making of profits,
the combining of wealth and effort, limited liability and flexibility in
financing, minimum investment, transferability of interest, centralized
management, continuity of existence, and so on. Methods of establish-
ment range from private agreement and declarations of trust through
compliance with general statutory requirements for organization or in-
61 Though the associations under examination are labelled "private" to distinguish them
from associations directly concerned with power, the formulation of problems is designed to
permit comparison of associations in nation-states of varying degrees of socialization. A more
detailed outline has been prepared by Professor Angel C. Cruz of tile University of the Phil-
ippines.
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corporation to special legislative franchise. Comprehensive description
of how community coercion is brought to bear to promote and police
private association requires comparison and contrast of doctrines and
practices with respect to all forms of association in the handling of a vari-
ety of distinguishable problems, such as (1) the formation of the particular
association, (2) financing the enterprise and determining the distribution
of profits and losses, (3) management and operation, (4) termination,
and (~) subjection to community claims. The type of detail relevant under
each of these problem headings may with respect to incorporated organ-
izations be impressionistically indicated as follows: formation (the role
of promoters, brokers, underwriters; pre-incorporation agreements; de
facto and de jure corporations; the structure of the corporate constitution
in articles of incorporation and by-laws), finance (assembling of assets,
stock issues and funded debts, redemption and retirement of shares;
dividend policies; reductions and increases of capital; regulation for pro-
tection of investors), management (official structure and distribution of
powers, corporate acts, fiduciary obligations of officials, responsibilities
to stockholders and others; stockholders' powers, election of officers,
derivative suits and other remedies; creditors' powers; control techniques
of various groups; impact of management policies on workers and con-
sumers), termination (sale of corporate assets, dissolution, merger and
consolidation, reorganization), and subjection to community claims (taxa-
tion, eminent domain, and regulation of businesses affected with a pub-
lic interest). The task of significant comparative study is to survey the
handling of these type problems for all forms of association in countries
of varying degrees of socialization and to appraise different forms and dif-
ferent doctrines and practices in terms of their impact both on the pro-
duction of goods and services and on other basic community values.
II. ASSOCIATIONS DEVOTED TO VALUES OTHER THAN WEALTH
The general inquiry is again what forms of association are afforded to
whom for seeking what values and detailed objectives and how does the
community promote and regulate such forms. Most contemporary com-
munities afford forms of association for the shaping and sharing of a great
variety of values other than wealth. Among the more obvious itemizations
for several values are these: for enlightenment, educational institutions
and societies, scientific and research foundations, associations for special-
ized communication; for well-being, charitable and philanthropic founda-
tions, community chests, hospitals, old folk homes, employees associa-
tions; for affection, family organizations, fraternal orders, and private
clubs; for rectitude, church organizations, temperance societies; for skill,
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professional associations, occupational clubs; for power, patriotic societies;
for respect, honorary societies, organizations for the advancement of par-
ticular groups; and so on. Methods of establishment again cover a con-
siderable range in private agreement, declaration of trust, unincorporated
association, incorporation under general law, and incorporation under
special "non-profit" provision. Comprehensive survey of how commu-
nity officials apply "property", "contract", "tort", and "corporation"
doctrines in promoting and regulating the associations so established re-
quires both precise determination of values at stake and institutional con-
text and, again, the careful specification of problem in formation, financ-
ing, management, termination, or subjection to community claims. Com-
parative study which makes such survey could do much to reveal the
varying degrees of freedom and of efficiency in promoting basic values in
different societies.
POLICY PROCEDURES
In the context of broad description of power processes and the relation
of doctrines and practices about agreements, deprivations, and private
associations to basic community values, comprehensive comparative study
for policy purposes may seek, finally, to explore in more detail the general
procedures by which community coercion is organized and exercised in
forming and applying policy. In traditional terms such procedures are
referred to as legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial. It has
long been common knowledge, however, that these words have come to
refer more to institutions than to specific functions and that an institution
labelled by anyone of the names may in fact engage in all procedures
and perform all functions. It is, accordingly, suggested that effective
comparative inquiry requires a more precise demarcation of functions and
that such demarcation might be in measure achieved by some such
categorization as the following: intelligence, recommending, prescribing,
invoking, applying, appraising, terminating. Brief indication can be
offered of the type and scope of inquiry under each heading.
I. Intelligence. The intelligence function of a community is that by
which it keeps itself informed and projects its plans. The performance of
this function requires the continuous and systematic study of conditions
and trends, inquiry into scientific interrelationships, the projection of
developmental contingencies, the clarification of goal values into detailed
programs, and the invention and appraisal of alternatives of action. The
important question is in what degree and how well these tasks are per-
formed in what governmental or non-governmental institutions. Compara-
tive survey might reveal that intelligence and its use in planning are as
necessary to discovering the minimum degree of authority and control
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conducive to democratic values as to maintaining a maximum of govern-
mental oppression and that it is suicidal misidentification to equate plan-
ning and regimentation. 62
II. Recommending. This is the function of taking initiative, and exerting
pressure, to secure specific decisions. Relevant investigation is of the de-
tailed roles of political parties, pressure groups, and private associations
in varying contexts. Appraisal might extend beyond condemnation of
vicious practices to assay of the conditions under which more groups and
individuals might participate in the processes of effective control.
III. Prescribing. This is the function of the formal enactment of policy
into authoritative community doctrine. The most general questions
are: How is this function divided among legislative, executive, adminis-
trative, judicial, and other institutions? How effectively is each institu-
tion organized for the performance of its role? What are the detailed prac-
tices of each institution? Appraisal may inquire whether structures and
practices are democratic in their responsibility to people affected, whether
they are comprehensive in taking adequate account of national, regional,
and local interests, and whether they are efficient (economic and prompt)
in promoting and securing such interests.
IV. Invoking. This is the function of setting in motion the community
machinery for the application of policy to concrete instances. It may be
imposed upon community officials (as in the case of crime or violation of
charitable trust) or left to private individuals (as in the case of private
wrongs or violations of the rules against perpetuities) and the important
question is what difference the location of this function makes for individ-
ual and community values.
V. Applying. This is the function of applying authoritatively prescribed
community policy to concrete instances. It again is divided among all the
conventional institutions of government-legislative, executive, admin-
istrative, judicial-and comparative investigation requires specification
of the structures and practices of such institutions in performance of the
function.
Some indication of the type of specification required may be made by
reference to judicial institutions.63 These institutions afford certain pro-
cedures which the community maintains for settling controversies be-
tween contending parties. Such procedures are designed to give both offi-
cials and private individuals opportunity (access to formal authority)
to test the behavior of other officials and private individuals for conform-
62 Lasswell and McDougal, Syllabus, Law Science, and Policy (1950); McDougal and Ro-
tival, The Case for Regional Planning with Special Reference to New England (1947).
63 A comprehensive outline of judicial procedures has been prepared by Professors Keith
Blinn, J. W. Bunkley, and George Pugh.
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ity with prescribed standards and to secure the application of community
coercion for maintaining such conformity. The controversies for whose
settlement judicial procedures may be invoked obviously cover the whole
range of community values and all institutional contexts. The important
general questions are: Do procedural doctrines and practices vary in
different controversies depending upon the values at stake and differences
in institutional context? If so, are such variations based upon rational
conceptions of how best to promote the various values in differing con-
texts? If not, should such variations be made for such purposes? These
questions may be made concrete with respect to such various procedural
steps as the following: for taking hold of the defendant, for taking hold
of the subject-matter of the controversy, for determining place and time
of hearing, for enlightening the tribunal and the parties concerning claims
and demands, for disposing of the controversy through agreed settlement,
for presenting proof at trial, for determining conflicting claims and order-
ing appropriate remedial action, for appeal and review, and for executing
\
judgment and enforcing remedial measures. Policy criteria for appraising
procedures may be sharpened in terms not only of efficiency in promoting
particular values but also of certain over-riding community goals, such
as equal opportunity to a fair hearing, decision in accordance with the pre-
scribed policies of the community, affording as much economy to all
parties as is consistent with other values, affording maximum respect for
human dignity with a minimum invasion of privacy or exercise of violence,
securing a maximum effect on the enlightenment processes of the com-
munity and in ceremonializing the community values at stake, eliminat-
ing biased and prejudiced decision-makers, and encouraging a maximum
use of scientific knowledge in ascertaining facts and shaping remedies.
VI. Appraising. This is a detailed application of the more general in-
telligence function to continuing survey of the consequences of policy
prescriptions and applications. Comparative investigation is not likely
to reveal common occurrence.
VII. Terminating. This is the function of putting an end to obsolete
prescriptions of policy. Commonly the function is performed by new pre-
scription. Special study of techniques for periodic revision and for resolv-
ing conflicts between prescriptions of differing times may, however, be
useful.
With some such comprehensive framework of guiding theory, it might
be possible for comparative study to rise to the challenge of contemporary
need and make its contribution to the more perfect union of the free world
and to the eventual organization of security and freedom throughout a
peaceful world community. Such a framework of theory would permit
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sufficiently precise description of the events to which decision-makers
respond in terms of value changes which transcend the doctrinal peculiar-
ities of particular nation-states; it would require the investigation by all
the techniques of modem science of how predispositional factors af-
fecting decision, such as character structure, class position, skills, and
attitudes, vary from nation-state to nation-state and from context to
context within nation-states; and it would, hence, make possible a mean-
ingful survey through time of how different decision-makers, with their
varying predispositions, appropriately located in different nation-states
apply technical doctrines of varying degrees of equivalence to comparable
problems to achieve identifiable effects on values. The importance for
policy, for the freedom and rationality of future decision, of the knowledge
that might be so obtained is beyond present calculation. Communities
might find, as individuals have found, that insightful knowledge of the
past and clear prevision of future alternatives immeasurably increases
potentialities. Though the universals it yields may ultimately be few,
comparative study at its best might reveal the details of short-term,
emerging relationships with unexpectedly high probability.64 Though it.
may never induce change in basic democratic values, such comparative
study might also supply the continuing flow of knowledge by which spe-
cific operational interpretations can be given value goals and such goals
be kept up to date. Enlargement of the context of community and power
processes being observed can certainly be expected only to enlarge knowl-
edge of expedients and alternatives and increase the possibilities of in-
vention. The hope that comparative study for policy purposes offers is,
in sum, that of understanding the power and other value processes in
which we live and of achieving the special insights necessary to effective
cooperation and survival in the contemporary world. Denied the experi-
mental method open to the physical sciences, applied legal science has no
rational alternative to such study. Should the challenge outlined appear
too formidable, it may be relevant to recall the principle, once invoked
by a great comparative scholar,85 that "the standard of human perform-
ance is apt, though not sure, to rise in proportion to the magnitude of an
undertaking."
64 The exposure of past rigidities in behavior may, it will perhaps bear emphasis, increase
appreciation of opportunities for future change. The function of science in legal study is not
so much that of predicting inevitabilities, as of stating the conditions of freedom.
66 The late Ernst Freund. Cf. Margaret Mead, "The Comparative Study of Culture and
the Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values," Conference on Science, Philosophy and
Religion (1942) 56, 65:
"Comparison of different cultures demonstrates that man may set his spiritual goal low or
high, that he may cast himself a cheap or a heroic role, and that as he casts himself, so will he
live and his children after him."
